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FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS-DEFINING THE




Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Colorado v. Connelly,' the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly defined what constitutes an "involuntary" confession under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Previously,
the Supreme Court considered confessions "involuntary" only in
situations involving police coercion.3 Although there was some sen-
timent among the Justices that "volition" or "free will" should be an
independent concern in confession cases, 4 each case in which the
Court found a confession "involuntary" nevertheless involved po-
lice misconduct, coercion, or deception.5 The Connelly majority reaf-
firmed a requirement that some variation of police "overreaching"
must be present before a defendant's confession could be labelled
1 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
2 The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)(police interrogated defendant for
four hours while he was under sedation and in "unbearable" pain in hospital intensive
care unit); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)(police held defendant for four days and
denied him medical attention and adequate food until he confessed); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)(police and "highly trained" lawyers interrogated defendant
for thirty-six hours and denied him rest and sleep).
4 See, e.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398-99 (concluding that defendant could not exercise
"a rational intellect and free will" when police questioned him in a hospital and defend-
ant was in "unbearable" pain and was encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing
apparatus); Reck, 367 U.S. at 440 (1960)(deciding that a confession is not "the product
of a rational intellect and free will" if "the defendant's will was overborne at the time he
confessed"); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 153 (holding that police coercion and mob violence
compelled defendant to confess).




as "involuntary" and subsequently suppressed.6 Connelly involved a
mentally-impaired defendant who made his incriminating state-
ments "involuntarily" as a result of self-generated compulsion ab-
sent police coercion. 7 The Supreme Court held, therefore, that
Connelly's statements should have been admitted into evidence.
8
The majority in Connelly also established that a "preponder-
ance" standard 9 is appropriate in determining if, under Miranda v.
Arizona,10 a defendant properly waived his fifth amendment rights.
Before Connelly, the Court had never enunciated a specific eviden-
tiary standard to be used in a consideration of whether a waiver of
the fifth amendment right to counsel and privilege against self-in-
crimination was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." The Miranda
Court had mandated only that the burden on the state for proving a
waiver was a "heavy" one and that the standard was "high."' 12 In
Connelly, the majority equated a "heavy" burden with the prepon-
derance standard, arguing that the voluntariness of a waiver is not
related to the reliability of a confession in proving guilt or inno-
cence.' 3 The Court also required that the state prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a waiver of the rights examined in
Miranda was knowing and intelligent. 14
This Note examines the Connelly opinions and concludes that
the Court's decision requiring the existence of police coercion as a
prerequisite for finding a confession "involuntary" represents ajus-
tified limitation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
This Note argues, however, that the Court's decision requiring a
lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard in proving that a
Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent is an im-
proper interpretation of Miranda's "heavy" burden and an unprece-
dented departure from the Court's own decisions. Finally, this Note
concludes that because Connelly could not have knowingly and in-
telligently waived his Miranda rights, the Court should have sup-
pressed Connelly's custodial statements.
6 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
7Id.
8 Id.
9 For an explanation of the "preponderance" standard, see infra note 72.
i0 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The fifth amendment provides, in relevant part: "[No per-
son] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
II For a discussion of the requirements of a proper waiver of Miranda rights, see infra
notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
13 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
14 Id.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF CONNELLY
On August 18, 1983, in downtown Denver, Colorado, Francis
Connelly approached Officer Patrick Anderson of the Denver Police
Department.' 5 Without any prompting, Connelly told Officer An-
derson that he had murdered someone and wanted to talk with An-
derson about the incident.' 6 Anderson immediately advised
Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said
could be used against him in a court of law, and that he had the right
to an attorney before any police questioning. 17 Connelly stated that
he understood the rights that Anderson had read to him but still
wished to talk about the alleged murder.' 8 Anderson then asked
Connelly several questions relating to Connelly's condition. 19
Although Connelly denied that he had been drinking or taking any
drugs, he admitted that he had been a patient in various mental hos-
pitals. 20 At that point, Officer Anderson reminded Connelly of his
right to remain silent.21 Connelly, however, said that his conscience
had been bothering him, that it was "all right," and that he wanted
to talk with Anderson. 22 In Anderson's opinion, Connelly seemed
to fully comprehend the nature of his acts.25
Within a short time, Homicide Detective Stephen Antuna ar-
rived on the scene.24 After Connelly again was advised of his rights,
and Antuna asked Connelly what he wanted to talk about, Connelly
stated that he had come from Boston to confess to a murder.25 An-
tuna took Connelly to police headquarters where a search of the
records revealed that the body of an unidentified female had been
found in April of 1983.26 Connelly then divulged the details of his
story to Antuna and another officer and readily agreed to take the
two officers to the scene of the killing.2 7 After he led the officers to
15 Id. at 518. Although he was in uniform, Anderson was working in an off-duty ca-
pacity. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also the discussion of Mi-
randa, infra, at notes 80-86 and accompanying text.







25 Id. Connelly was claiming responsibility for the November, 1982 murder of Mary
Ann Junta in Denver. Id.
26 Id. The body presumably was discovered somewhere in the Denver area although




the vicinity of the crime, Connelly showed them the precise location
of the killing.28 Detective Antuna observed no indications that Con-
nelly was suffering from any kind of mental illness. 29
The police held Connelly in custody overnight.30 During an in-
terview with a representative of the public defender's office the next
day, Connelly, for the first time, became visibly disoriented. 31 The
suspect was subsequently sent to a state hospital for psychological
evaluation. 32 By March of 1984, the doctors evaluating Connelly
concluded that he was competent to stand trial. 33
At a preliminary hearing before the trial, Connelly successfully
moved to suppress all of the statements made to the officers of the
Denver Police Department. 34 Doctor Jeffrey Metzner, a psychiatrist
employed by the state, testified for Connelly at the hearing.3 5 In his
expert opinion, Dr. Metzner determined that Connelly was suffering
from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at the time
of his confession.3 6 According to Dr. Metzner, Connelly was exper-
iencing "command hallucinations. "3 7 Based on his interviews with
Connelly, Dr. Metzner testified that the "voices" interfered with
Connelly's volitional abilities but did not significantly impair his
cognitive abilities. 38 Metzner concluded, therefore, that Connelly
had understood his right to remain silent when Officer Anderson




31 Id. at 518-19. Connelly, for example, began giving confused answers to questions.
Id. He also stated that "voices" had compelled him to come to Denver and that these
voices had persuaded him to confess. Id.
32 Id. at 519.
33 Id. When Connelly first arrived at the hospital, however, he was found incompe-




37 Id. Connelly revealed to Dr. Metzner that Connelly was following the "voice of
God." This voice had instructed Connelly to obtain money, buy an airplane ticket, and
fly from Boston to Denver. After arriving in Denver, the voice of "God" became more
emphatic and told Connelly either to confess to the Junta killing or to commit suicide.
Motivated by these supernatural suggestions, Connelly approached Officer Anderson
determined to confess. Id.
38 Id. "Volitional ability" refers to one's "ability to make free and rational choices."
Id. "Cognition" refers to "[klnowledge gained as through perception, reasoning, or
intuition." N. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 278
(Anne H. Soukhanov ed. 1984).
39 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519. Although Dr. Metzner admitted that the "voices" might
actually have been Connelly's own interpretation of his guilt, Dr. Metzner asserted that
in his judgment, Connelly's psychosis induced his confession. Id.
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Based on this evidence, the Colorado trial court granted Con-
nelly's motion to suppress his incriminating statements. 40 Even
though the police officers had not engaged in any misconduct, the
court found that the statements were "involuntary" and therefore
inadmissible as a violation of Connelly's rights under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.4 ' Relying upon the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Townsend v. Swain 42 and Culombe v. Con-
necticut,43 the trial court ruled that a confession is admissible only if
it is a consequence of a defendant's "rational intellect and 'free
will.' "44 Although the court found that the police had not wrong-
fully coerced Connelly into confessing, Connelly's mental condition
had impaired his volitional abilities. 45 Therefore, Connelly had con-
fessed without a rational intellect or free will.46 The court held, fur-
thermore, that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of
proving by "clear and convincing" evidence that Connelly volunta-
rily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights to obtain counsel
and to remain silent.47 Consequently, the trial 'court suppressed
both Connelly's initial statements to Officer Anderson and his cus-
todial confessions. 48
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing.49 The court emphasized that "[t]he ultimate test of voluntari-
ness is whether the statement was the product of a rational intellect
and a free will." 50 Moreover, the court explained, involuntariness
may be the result of other influences, such as severe mental illness,
which negate rational judgment and free choice and may exist in the
absence of any police coercion.5 1 The court held that the evidence
supported a finding that Connelly's initial statements were not the
product of rational judgment and free choice.52 Furthermore, be-
40 Id.
41 Id. For the relevant text of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 2.
42 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
43 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
44 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519 (quoting Record at 16).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)("The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and in-
telligently."). For a more complete account of the trial court's ruling, see People v.
Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Colo. 1985). The trial court also held that Connelly
could not have waived his right to counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination in his mentally damaged state. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
48 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
49 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
50 Id. at 728.
51 Id.
52 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
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cause of Connelly's mental state, the court concluded that the ade-
quate waiver of his rights while in custody was impossible.53 The
Colorado Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the lower court's sup-
pression of Connelly's statements. 54
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and con-
sidered two issues. First, the Court analyzed whether Connelly's
precustodial or custodial statements made in a mental condition
which interfered with "rational intellect" and "free will" should be
suppressed as "involuntary" under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. 55 Second, the Court considered whether the state's
burden in proving a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights should
be a lower "preponderance" standard5 6 or a more strenuous "dear
and convincing" or "reasonable doubt" standard.57
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD FOR
SUSPECT CONFESSIONS.
Beginning with its decision in Brown v. Mississippi,58 the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause protects an accused from the use of evi-
dence garnered through an "involuntary" confession. The Brown
Court held that the use of torture to procure a confession violates a
defendant's right to due process of law. 59 In each case after Brown
in which the Court has found a confession "involuntary," police offi-
cials have likewise acted in a coercive or threatening manner.60
Since Brown, police officials have utilized more psychological
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 519-22.
56 For a brief examination of the various evidentiary standards, see infra note 72.
57 Id. at 522-24.
58 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, the police gathered three black men who the police
suspected of committing a murder. Id. at 281-82. After each man had denied any in-
volvement in the crime, the police hanged and severely whipped the "suspects" until
they confessed to the satisfaction of their interrogators. Id.
59 Id. at 285-87. The Brown Court stated that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confes-
sions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for
conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286.
60 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)(police interrogated defendant for
four hours while he was under sedation and in "unbearable" pain in hospital intensive
care unit); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)(police held defendant for four days and
denied him medical attention and adequate food until he confessed); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)(police and "highly trained" lawyers interrogated defendant
for thirty-six hours and denied him rest and sleep).
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forms of persuasion. 61 The Court, therefore, has often focused on
the mental condition of a defendant to determine the defendant's
ability at the time of the interrogation to withstand such persuasion.
The suspect in the landmark case of Spano v. New York, 6 2 for exam-
ple, was a twenty-five year-old Italian immigrant with an eighth
grade education and a history of mental instability.63 Although po-
lice interrogators did not physically coerce Spano's confession, they
exploited Spano's limited mental abilities. 64 The Spano Court relied
on the petitioner's mentally deficient state and the coercive police
interrogation tactics to determine that the confession was involun-
tary and thus inadmissible. 65
Similarly, the Court, given proof of police misconduct, has been
careful to consider a defendant's mental illness in determining if a
confession was "involuntary." The Court in Blackburn v. Alabama,66
for instance, concluded that the defendant was insane and incompe-
tent at the time of his confession.67 The Court, relying on its dec-
sion in Brown, held that the use of the defendant's confession to
convict him violated the due process clause.68 Likewise, the Court
in Townsend v. Swain 69 examined the defendant's mental state in
judging his ability to resist police tactics. The Townsend Court con-
cluded that the interrogation process conducted by the police of-
ficers-which included the administration of drugs-produced a
61 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
62 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
63 Id. at 321-22.
64 Id. at 319. Spano's interrogators also took advantage of the relationship between
Spano and a police officer who was a close friend of Spano. Id. After eight hours of lies
and trickery, the police officer induced Spano to confess. Id. at 319-22.
65 Id. at 322-23.
66 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
67 Id. at 207. Blackburn had been discharged from the armed services as "perma-
nently disabled by a psychosis." Id. at 200. After doctors examined Blackburn in a
mental ward, they diagnosed him as having a "schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type."
Id. at 201.
68 Id. at 211. Employing a "totality of the circumstances" approach, the Blackburn
Court considered "the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which
was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends,
relatives, or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff
rather than by Blackburn." Id. at 207-08. The Court stated that "in cases involving
involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that
important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course
of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will." Id. at
206-07.
69 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Townsend, the defendant, was a nineteen-year-old heroin
addict with the intelligence level of slightly above a "moron" at the time of the interro-
gation. Id. at 303.
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confession which was not tle product of a free intellect. 70 As a re-
suit, Townsend's confession was ruled inadmissible.71 Tradition-
ally, therefore, the Supreme Court has carefully examined a
defendant's state of mind when considering a confession's
"involuntariness."
On the other hand, the Court has required the state to prove
the "voluntariness" of a confession only by a "preponderance" of
the evidence, not by "clear and convincing" evidence. 72 In Lego v.
Twomey, 73 the Court upheld a state practice requiring the less bur-
densome "preponderance of evidence" standard in establishing the
voluntariness of a confession.74 In upholding the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling, the Lego plurality examined the purposes for sup-
pressing confessions. 75 According to the Lego Court, coerced con-
fessions are not suppressed because of any inherent unreliability. 76
Rather, "[t]he use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is
forbidden because the method used to extract them offends consti-
tutional principles." 77 Thus, the Court concluded, the "voluntari-
ness" calculus is unrelated to the substantive issue of innocence or
guilt. 78 Jury verdicts, therefore, are not rendered more unreliable
70 Id. at 308. The police gave the suspect pain relief from his withdrawal symptoms
as well as a drug with "truth-serum" properties. Id. at 298-99. After the administration
of the drug, Townsend readily confessed. Id. at 299.
71 Id. at 299.
72 A preponderance of evidence "is of greater weight or more convincing than the
evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows
that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLACK'S LAw Di-rnoNAtY
1064 (5th ed. 1979). On the other hand, clear and convincing proof means "proof be-
yond a reasonable, i.e., a well-founded doubt." Id. at 227. Typically, clear and convinc-
ing proof "is intermediate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent of
such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases." Id.
73 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
74 Id. In Lego, the testimony of the defendant conflicted with that of the police con-
cerning the use of physical violence by police interrogators. Id. at 480. The trial judge
admitted the defendant's confession but did not instruct the jury that they had to find
that the confession was voluntarily made before using it to determine a verdict. Id. at
481. On appeal, Lego argued that the "trial judge should have found the confession
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting it into evidence." Id. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable doubt" standard in favor of a "preponder-
ance" standard. Id.
75 Id. at 482-87.
76 Id. at 484-85 (citingJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)). In Jackson, the peti-
tioner was found guilty of murder after the trial court allowed his confession into evi-
dence. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 374-75. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the state
procedure which allowed the jury to consider the issue of "voluntariness" of the confes-
sion along with the issues determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. Id. at 386-
87.
77 Lego, 404 U.S. at 485 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961)).
78 Id. at 486-87. The petitioner in Lego also asserted that exclusionary rules protect
against abuses that are themselves fundamental concerns regardless of their impact on
884 [Vol. 78
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by requiring a less stringent "preponderance" standard in a volun-
tariness determination. 79
IV. HiSTORicAL ROOTS OF THE BURDEN OF PROVING A VALID
WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
Since the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,80 police officials
have been required to explicitly inform suspects in a custodial inter-
rogation of the suspects' right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination. However, a suspect may waive his rights guaranteed
by Miranda if his waiver is "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." 8'
Neither Miranda nor its progeny, however, had established exactly
what burden of proof the state must meet in order to successfully
prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights. The Miranda Court, though,
did state that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demon-
strate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel."'82 The Court also asserted that it has always
required "high" standards of proof for the establishment of a waiver
of constitutional rights.8 3 Post-Miranda cases have similarly re-
quired the state to meet a "high" or "heavy" burden in proving a
valid waiver of Miranda rights.8 4 However, the Court has never ex-
plicitly defined whether a "heavy" burden of proof requires a "pre-
ponderance," "clear and convincing," or "reasonable doubt"
standard.
In analyzing whether a confession is "voluntary, knowing, and
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Id. at 487-88. These fundamental concerns
include, among other things, the exclusion of confessions resulting from custodial inter-
rogations unless adequate warnings are given and a waiver is obtained consistent with
Miranda. Id. Therefore, Lego argued, these concerns should require a stricter standard
of proof for admissibility. Id. at 488. The Court, though, concluded that "no substantial
evidence [exists] that federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id.
79 Id. at 486.
80 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81 Id. at 444.
82 Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n.14 (1964))(emphasis
added).
83 Id. (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The petitioner in Johnson had
been convicted of passing counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 460.
On appeal, the prosecution asserted that the petitioner had effectively waived his sixth
amendment right to counsel. Id. at 463-64. In determining if the petitioner had "intelli-
gently" waived his right to counsel, the Johnson Court stated that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights .. " Id. at
464.
84 For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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intelligent," the Court has divided the inquiry into two distinct
"dimensions":
First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an un-
coerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court
properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. 85
According to the Moran Court, therefore, a defendant may not be
coerced by the police into waiving his Miranda rights, and the de-
fendant must be able to understand the consequences of his Miranda
waiver.8 6
V. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. REFUSING TO EXPAND THE "VOLUNTARY" STANDARD
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in Colo-
rado v. Connelly.87 The majority, relying on Brown v. Mississippi 8 8 and
its progeny, refused to extend the voluntariness standard to enable
a trial court to suppress a confession given without police coer-
cion.89 In the absence of police coercion, the majority ruled that
Connelly confessed voluntarily, and, therefore, his confession was ad-
missible.90 Under the Court's rationale, the confession was "volun-
tary" despite evidence indicating that Connelly confessed with his
85 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986)(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). In Moran, the defendant was advised of his rights, interrogated,
and later signed a confession statement. Id. at 1139. The police, however, refused to let
the defendant see the attorney that the defendant's sister had procured for him. Id. The
Court held that the defendant's waiver of both his right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination was valid because he knew the consequences of his acts even
in the absence of his counsel. Id. at 1141.
86 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
87 107 S. Ct. 515, 518-24 (1986). Concurring in toto with Chief Justice Rehnquist
were Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Blackmun concurred in all
parts except in the portion of the opinion dealing with the level of the state's burden of
proof in demonstrating a valid Miranda waiver. For a brief discussion ofJustice Black-
mun's opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 155-57. Justice Stevens concurred in
part but dissented in part, drawing on a distinction between precustodial and postcus-
todial statements. For a discussion of Justice Stevens' opinion, see infra notes 158-66
and accompanying text. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in dissent. See infra
notes 167-234 and accompanying text.
88 297 U.S. 278 (1936). For a discussion of the Brown decision, see supra notes 58-79
and accompanying text.
89 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 519-22.
90 Id. at 522.
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volitional abilities impaired. 9' The Court, therefore, reversed the
Supreme Court of Colorado's ruling that the confession was invol-
untary and, consequently, inadmissible. 92
At the outset, the majority discussed the application of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 93 ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist pointed out that the Supreme Court recently had held that cer-
tain police interrogation tactics were so offensive to the notion of
due process that the misconduct had to be condemned.94 Accord-
ing to the majority, the impetus for the ruling in Brown v. Missis-
sippi95 was coercive government misconduct.96 The Brown Court
held that the use of confessions obtained through torturous means
was clearly "revolting to the sense of justice" and a clear denial of
due process. 97 Thus, according to the Connelly majority, the due
process focus in confession cases revolves around police
misconduct. 98
Analyzing the post-Brown line of confession cases, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist concluded that this due process focus on police miscon-
duct has, without exception, provided the basis for considering a
confession's "involuntariness." 99 The Chief Justice conceded that
each of the confession cases had been decided on its own particular
facts. 0 0 He emphasized, however, that in each confession case in
which the Court found that suspects' statements were given involun-
tarily, the unifying thread was some variation of police misconduct
in procuring the confession.' 0 ' More recently, the Court noted, as
91 Id.
92 Id. at 519-20.
93 Id. at 519-20. For the relevant text of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 2.
94 Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985)). In Miller, the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]his Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques,
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are
so offensive to a civilized system ofjustice that they must be condemned under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller, 106 S. Ct. at 449.
95 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Court in Brown firmly established that in a state action
citizens should be protected from self-incrimination through "involuntary" confessions.
Id.
96 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
97 Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. For a discussion of the Brown decision, see supra notes 58-
79 and accompanying text.
98 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
99 Id. at 521.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 520 n.1. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (police interrogated
defendant for four hours while he was under sedation and in "unbearable" pain in hos-
pital intensive care unit); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)(police held defendant for
four days and denied him medical attention and adequate food until he confessed); Ash-
craft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)(police and "highly trained" lawyers interro-
gated defendant for thirty-six hours and denied him rest or sleep).
887
8 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
police officials have employed subtler forms of "psychological per-
suasion" in interrogations, courts have placed greater emphasis on
the mental condition of the defendant in a voluntariness analysis.10 2
The majority stressed, however, that a court should never rely solely
on a defendant's mental condition in a "voluntariness" determina-
tion.103 According to the Connelly majority, therefore, official coer-
cion is a necessary element in deciding that a confession has been
given involuntarily. 0 4 Without such conduct, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist concluded, "there is simply no basis for concluding that any
state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of
law."' 0 5
ChiefJustice Rehnquist next considered two cases used by Con-
nelly to support the contention that a suspect's deficient mental con-
dition apart from State misconduct may render a confession
involuntary.10 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court
in Blackburn v. Alabama 107 analyzed the petitioner's mental state in
the context of other relevant circumstances created by the police.108
Thus, according to the majority, Blackburn's mental condition was
not dispositive of the "voluntariness" question. 10 9 Similarly, Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the use of a two-pronged analysis, re-
lying upon the Townsend Court's inquiry into both the state's imper-
missible conduct as well as the detainee's mental condition in a
determination of "voluntariness." 110 Thus, the Connelly majority
concluded that although an individual's mental condition is ger-
maine in determining his susceptibility to police coercion, a court
must go beyond examining only the mental state of a defendant in a
due process inquiry."'
The Chief Justice also discussed the requisite "state action"
needed to invoke the application of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 112 Although the police committed no
wrongful acts, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that at-
102 Con.elly, 107 S. Ct. at 520 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)). For a
discussion of the Spano decision, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
103 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960). For a discussion of the Blackburn and Townsend decisions, see supra notes 66-
71 and accompanying text.
107 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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tempting to admit Connelly's statements into evidence constituted
sufficient "state action" in order to invoke the application of the due
process clause." 3 Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that state action existed
for the purposes of the due process clause even though no imper-
missible police action existed."14
Finally, the majority considered several policy issues which fur-
ther established the necessity of a link between coercive activity by
the state and the resulting confession's "involuntariness." ' "15 First,
the majority argued that without this necessary link and in the ab-
sence of police coercion, a court's ruling on admissibility would
have to consider a defendant's every motivation for making incrimi-
nating statements. 1 6 Moreover, even the most extreme behavior by
a private party attempting to gather evidence against a defendant
has historically failed to make that evidence inadmissible under the
due process clause. 117 ChiefJustice Rehnquist also focused on the
cost to society's interest in law enforcement resulting from the ex-
clusion of relevant evidence." 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that the purpose of excluding improperly seized evidence is to sub-
stantially deter future violations of constitutional protections.' '
The suppression of Connelly's statements, according to the Chief
113 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728-29 (1985).
114 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
115 In part, ChiefJustice Rehnquist was responding to the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado's analysis which implicitly rejected a necessary link between these two elements.
For the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court on this issue, see People v. Connelly,
702 P.2d 722, 728-29 (Colo. 1985).
116 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
117 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist cited several cases to support this contention. See, e.g.,
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (Court concluded that federal govern-
ment searches of packages were not unlawful to the extent that the packages had already
been examined by third parties); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-88
(1971) (Court concluded that the fourth and fourteenth amendments should not discour-
age private citizens from helping the state in the apprehension of criminals); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921)(Court held that documents stolen and then ob-
tained by the federal government for use in a prosecution should not have been sup-
pressed because the governmental authority did not violate the accused's rights).
118 See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521 (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627
(1980) (Court concluded that policies of the exclusionary rule do not necessarily bar im-
peachment of a witness on cross-examination)); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
448-49 (1976)("Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary
rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its pro-
scription of what concededly is relevant evidence."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)("Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons.").




Justice, would not serve any purpose in enforcing constitutional
guarantees. 120 Thus, the majority concluded that "[o]nly if we were
to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal
defendant to confess his crime only when totally rational and prop-
erly motivated-could respondent's present claim be sustained."' 2 '
Additionally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist addressed the purposes of the
criminal trial itself, noting that the exclusion of evidence naturally
deflects the trial process from its goal of determining the guilt or
innocence of an accused. 22 The Court rejected Connelly's conten-
tions that the Court should "make sweeping inquiries into the state
of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed" in the absence
of police coercion.1 23 Rather, according to the majority, the defend-
ant's mental state and its effect on his statements to police officials,
absent police misconduct, is best left to state laws governing rules of
evidence. 124 In dismissing the issue of the reliability of such a con-
fession, the majority concluded that " 'It]he aim of the requirement
of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true
or false.' "125 The issue of reliability, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, is best left to the individual states' rules of evidence.' 2 6
The Connelly majority, therefore, held that coercive police activ-
ity is a prerequisite to a finding that a suspect's statements are "in-
voluntary" within the meaning of the due process clause. 127
Because the police did not mistreat or coerce Connelly into making
self-incriminating statements in this case, the Court held that the
statements could be admitted into evidence without a constitutional
transgression. 28
B. BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE VALID WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS:
EMBRACING THE PREPONDERANCE STANDARD
The majority proceeded to focus on the second major issue
presented in Colorado v. Connelly: whether or not the state met its
burden of proving that Connelly had waived his Miranda rights. Be-
cause evidence indicated that Connelly's mental condition had im-
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 521-22.
123 Id. at 522.
124 Id.
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paired his volitional abilities, 129 Connelly argued that a voluntary
waiver was impossible. 130 Justice Rehnquist attempted through an
analysis of post-Miranda cases to establish first, that the state need
only establish a waiver of Miranda rights by a "preponderance" of
the evidence as opposed to a "clear and convincing" standard,' 3 '
and second, that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in holding
that Connelly's waiver was "involuntary" in the absence of police
coercion. ' 32
Initially, ChiefJustice Rehnquist conceded that a "heavy" bur-
den rests on the state to prove that the defendant waived both his
right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. 33 How-
ever, the majority opinion stressed that the Supreme Court had
never held a "heavy" burden to mean the "clear and convincing"
standard.'3 4 ChiefJustice Rehnquist utilized Lego v. Twomey 135 and
its progeny which require a "preponderance" of evidence to prove
the voluntariness of a confession.' 36 He argued that a trial court
should require the same preponderance standard in proving the vol-
untariness of a waiver of rights guaranteed by Miranda.137
In Lego, the Supreme Court upheld a state practice requiring
only a preponderance of evidence in establishing the voluntariness
of a confession.13 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist in Connelly argued that
this practice was upheld for two reasons. First, although proving
the elements of a crime naturally requires a reasonable doubt stan-
dard, the voluntariness determination does not relate to the actual
elements of a crime.' 3 9 On the contrary, the majority noted, the
voluntariness determination is designed to protect against police co-
ercion.1 40 Second, a higher standard of proof is not necessary to
129 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 170-71.
130 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
131 See supra note 72 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two evidentiary
standards.
132 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522-24.
'33 Id. at 522 (citing Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam); North Caro-
lina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1965)).
134 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
135 404 U.S. 477 (1972). See supra notes 73-79 for an examination of the Lego decision.
136 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
137 Id. at 522-23.
138 Lego, 404 U.S. at 477.
139 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522 (citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 482-86).
140 Id. A more thorough discussion of the purposes of a voluntariness determination
in the area of criminal confessions can be found in Lego, 404 U.S. at 484-85. In Lego,
Justice White conceded that the involuntariness of a confession may indeed relate to its
reliability. Id. The Court stated, however, that the rationale for requiring only a pre-
ponderance standard was not related to reducing the possibility of convicting innocent
men. Id. at 485 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377-91 (1964)). Rather, the
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serve the values protected by the exclusionary rule. 41 Thus, Chief
Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the independent values of the exclu-
sionary rule are not sufficient to require the state to prove admissi-
bility beyond a reasonable doubt. 142 Furthermore, there was no
evidence that federal rights have been hurt by the preponderance
standard. 143 The Chief Justice asserted that the proper burden of
proof at "voluntariness" suppression hearings is a preponderance
standard.144 The Court concluded by equating the confession and
waiver requirements, stating that "[i]f as we held in Lego v. Two-
mey... the voluntariness of a confession need be established only by
a preponderance of the evidence, then a waiver of the auxiliary pro-
tection established in Miranda should require no higher burden of
proof."' 45 Thus, the Court held that the state must only meet a pre-
ponderance standard in proving Connelly's waiver of his Miranda
rights. 146
Based upon his interpretation of Lego and the burden of proof
required for waiver, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
Supreme Court of Colorado erred in its determination that Con-
nelly did not properly waive his Miranda rights.' 47 While conceding
that a suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights need to be "voluntary,"
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the Colorado court improperly
injected the concept of "free will" into this constitutional con-
text.' 48 The Miranda warnings, the Chief Justice asserted, are
Court's concern centered around the protection of a defendant from his own statements
procured through police coercion. Id.
141 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522 (citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 487-89). See infra note 280 and
accompanying text for a discusssion of the exclusionary rule.
142 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522-23.
14 Id. at 523 (citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 488).
144 Id. (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984)("We are unwilling to
impose added burdens on the already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by
enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned truth before juries."); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)("IT]he controlling burden of proof at
suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.. ."); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957)(holding that "the
petitioner had the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did
not intelligently and understandingly waive his right to counsel.")).
145 Id.
146 Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in Lego. 404 U.S. at 490-95 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). He argued that a preponderance standard necessarily results in the
conviction of more defendants who are in fact innocent. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan concluded, therefore, that a more stringent standard of proof should be
applied to determinations of the "voluntariness" of confessions. Id. (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). For a discussion of Justice Brennan's dissent, see infra notes 213-19 and ac-
companying text.
147 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
148 Id.
892 [Vol. 78
1988] SELF-INCRIMINATION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED
designed to protect suspects' fifth amendment rights in the face of
governmental coercion. 149 However, the fifth amendment, accord-
ing to the majority, does not protect suspects against psychological
pressures to confess motivated by factors outside of official state ac-
tions. 150 In Connelly, ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that during the
interrogation of Connelly, the police never acted improperly or co-
erced a statement from him.' 5 ' Although Connelly's confession
may have been "coerced" in a psychological or philosophical sense,
such compulsion does not render his waiver of Miranda rights inva-
lid, according to the ChiefJustice's rationale. 152 The majority only
recognized compulsion resulting from government coercion; all
other types of "compulsions" or "involuntariness" are matters "to
which the United States Constitution does not speak."' 53 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.' 54
VI. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Blackmun concurred with the judgment of the Court.155
He refused, however, to join with the majority in addressing the
state's burden of proof in a waiver of Miranda rights.' 56 That issue,
explained Justice Blackmun, was neither raised nor briefed by the
parties involved. 157
VII. JUSTICE STEVENS' OPINION
Justice Stevens dissented from the part of the majority opinion
dealing with Connelly's post-custodial statements.1 58 According to
Justice Stevens, the only issues raised by the state of Colorado re-
149 Id. (citing Miranda, 436 U.S. at 460, 476 (deciding the waiver issue in the context
of police coercion); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.5 (1977)("AI1 of
Miranda's safeguards which are designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the
overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was caused by the isolation of a sus-
pect in police custody.")).
150 Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1984))(The fifth amendment is
not concerned "with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from
sources other than official coercion."); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141
(1986)("[Ihe relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it
was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or
deception .. ")).




155 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
156 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
157 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
158 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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lated to Connelly's precustodial statements. 159 Justice Stevens,
however, agreed with the ChiefJustice that the Constitution did not
require the suppression of Connelly's precustodial statements.' 60
Justice Stevens found that the statements were involuntary because
of Connelly's mental condition, but he stressed that Connelly's
statements were not involuntary as the result of the state's compul-
sion.161 According to Justice Stevens, the trial court should have
admitted the precustodial statements. 162
On the other hand, Justice Stevens argued that Connelly's post-
custodial statements were made in the absence of a valid waiver of
his Miranda rights.' 63 Any waiver of Miranda protections, Justice
Stevens asserted, must be " 'voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice.' "164 Because Connelly
could not exercise "free will" in a waiver of his Miranda rights, Jus-
tice Stevens reasoned, the post-custodial interrogation was neces-
sarily coercive. 165  Justice Stevens, therefore, concluded that
Connelly's post-custodial statements were inadmissible.' 66
VIII. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the
issue of whether Connelly's statements should have be suppressed
because they were made "involuntarily". 16 7 Justices Brennan and
Marshall also dissented on the issue of whether the proper standard
of proof for establishing a valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights
should be a "preponderance" standard or a more stringent "clear
and convincing" standard.' 68 In short, Justice Brennan explained
that he dissented because "the use of a mentally ill person's involun-
tary confession is antithetical to the notion of fundamental fairness
embodied in the Due Process Clause."' 69
Initially, Justice Brennan examined the gravity of Connelly's
159 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
160 Id. at 524-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
161 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens explained
that "[a]lthough [the] statements may well be so unreliable that they could not support a
conviction, at this stage of the proceeding I could not say that they have no probative
force whatever." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
163 Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Moran v. Burbine,
106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986)).
165 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
166 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
167 Id. at 525-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 531-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mental condition. 170 Although conceding that the trial court found
no police misconduct, the dissent stressed that the trial court found
overwhelming evidence that Connelly had absolutely no volitional
abilities at the time of his statements to the Denver police.17 1 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court of Colorado prop-
erly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the state had not proven
beyond a preponderance of the evidence that Connelly's initial
statement to Officer Anderson was voluntary and that the state had
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Connelly had
effectively waived his rights under Miranda.172
A. CONNELLY'S "INVOLUNTARY" CONFESSION
Justice Brennan's dissent centered around his willingness to ex-
tend the due process "voluntariness" inquiry beyond the confines of
police misconduct. 173 The dissent, relying on the same precedent
employed by the majority, attempted to demonstrate how the ad-
mission of the statements of a mentally ill individual is "antithetical
to due process."' 74 Justice Brennan refused to interpret these au-
thorities as establishing police coercion as the ultimate test of a con-
fession's "involuntariness" for the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.' 7 5 Rather, he identified Connelly as a case of first im-
pression because the Court had never explicitly confined its due
170 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan carefully detailed Connelly's long
history of mental problems. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Connelly had been hospital-
ized five times for psychiatric reasons. He also heard imaginary voices, claimed he saw
nonexistent objects, and thought that he wasJesus and his father was God. Justice Bren-
nan emphasized that Dr. Meztner testified that " 'when [Connelly] was read his Miranda
rights, he probably had the capacity to know that he was being read his Miranda rights
[but] he wasn't able to use that information because of the command hallucinations that
he had experienced.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Record at 56-57).
171 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The absence of police wrongdoing should not, by
itself, determine the voluntariness of a confession by a mentally ill person.").
174 Id. at 527 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that" '[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion.., the right of a person to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will'. . . This right
requires vigilant protection if we are to safeguard the values of private conscience and
human dignity." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964)). Justice Brennan asserted:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the con-
fession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?...
The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion,
of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602
(1961)(emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
175 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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process focus to police coercion. 176
The dissent then examined the Supreme Court decisions in
Townsend v. Swain 177 and Blackburn v. Alabama 17 8 and found that the
majority opinion erred in determining that the central point of in-
quiry in these cases was police coercion.179 Justice Brennan argued,
for example, that the Townsend Court examined a variety of relevant
factors other than the police misconduct, including the defendant's
drug addiction, his age, and his mental deficiency.' 80 Moreover,
Justice Brennan explained, police misconduct resulting from the ad-
ministration of a "truth serum" in Townsend was not the critical is-
sue.18 1 The dissent also discussed the Townsend Court's
interpretation of the Supreme Court opinion in Blackburn.'8 2 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the Townsend Court concluded that the
determinative issue in Blackburn was the defendant's mental defi-
ciency at the time of confession, and not the improper actions of the
police in securing the confession.' 8 3 The Connelly majority, Justice
176 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan admitted that in the relevant line of
post-Brown confession cases, police misconduct had been a recurring element of the
Court's analysis. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He emphasized, however, that in each of
these cases the Court has clearly focused on the presence or absence of "free will" and
that this factor should be an independent concern. See id. at 527-28 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1977)(concluding that
defendant could not exercise "a rational intellect and free will" when police questioned
him in a hospital, defendant was in "unbearable" pain and encumbered by tubes, need-
les, and breathing apparatus); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1960)(deciding that a
confession is not "the product of a rational intellect and free will" if "the defendant's
will was overborne at the time he confessed"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153
(1944)(holding that police coercion and mob violence compelled defendant to confess
involuntarily).
177 372 U.S. 293 (1963). For a discussion of the Townsend decsion, see notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
178 361 U.S. 199 (1960). For a discussion of the Blackburn Court's rationale, see notes
66-68 and accompanying text.
179 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308 n.4).
181 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
It is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the questions
asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's properties as a "truth serum," if these
properties exist. Any questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confes-
sion which is not the product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible.
The Court has usually so stated the test.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis in origi-
nal))(footnote omitted).
182 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
In Blackburn v. Alabama ... we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper
purpose on the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that
the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we
judged the confession inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant
was in fact insane at the time.
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Brennan asserted, ignored this precedent.1 84
Even if "involuntariness" does require state action, Justice
Brennan argued that police overreaching is not the only form of
state misconduct justifying the suppression of a confession. 185 The
dissent asserted that a trial court's admission of a confession into
evidence constitutes sufficient "state action" for the purposes of the
due process clause. 186 Therefore, Justice Brennan reasoned that the
action of a trial court in knowingly admitting a statement which was
not a product of an accused's free will would constitute sufficient
state misconduct to warrant an involuntariness analysis under the
due process clause. 187
Like the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion details the
various policy factors to be considered in the confession analysis. In
response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern that courts should
not be required to "divine" a suspect's motivation to confess, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that the courts traditionally have examined the
"totality of circumstances, including the motivation and competence
of the defendant, in determining whether a confession is volun-
tary."' 8 8 Moreover, Justice Brennan pointed out that the majority
admitted that in recent years interrogators have increasingly utilized
psychological pressures instead of physical coercion. 8 9 This use of
psychological pressure, according to Justice Brennan, is inconsistent
with the majority's argument that, historically, courts will only admit
confessions given as a result of free will. 190
Justice Brennan's main policy concern centered on the reliabil-
ity of confessions given by mentally ill individuals. 191 The accusato-
rial system of justice, the dissent posited, relies on skillful
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added byJus-
tice Brennan)).
184 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "the Due Process Clause
requires 'that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.'" Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)(quoted in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)(em-
phasis added by the Brown Court))).
187 Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the state in
fact knew of Connelly's mental incapacity. Id. n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan concluded that "even under this Court's test requiring police wrongdoing, the
record indicates that the officers here had sufficient knowledge about the defendant's
mental incapacity to render the confession 'involuntary'." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the Connelly majority, id. at 520).
190 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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investigation and not on a suspect's confession.1 92 Justice Brennan
explained that the heightened use of unreliable confessions will lead
to a less reliable and more easily abused system of justice.193 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the due process clause has reflected the foundations of the accusato-
rial system and its concern with reliability.' 94 Justice Brennan ob-
served that much of our mistrust surrounding the use of confessions
stems from the great impact confessions have upon the trier of
fact. 195 The reliability of a confession, accordingly, must be care-
fully analyzed before the fact finder has an opportunity to consider
the confession in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. 196
In Connelly, Justice Brennan pointed out, the record revealed that
the defendant was actively hallucinating and highly delusional at the
time of his incriminating statements. 197 Furthermore, Justice Bren-
nan noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself observed that a " 'state-
ment rendered by one in the condition of respondent might prove
to be quite unreliable.' "198 The reliability problem in Connelly was
compounded, according to the dissent, because no other physical
evidence implicated Connelly with the crime. 199 At a minimum, Jus-
tice Brennan concluded, a trial court should make an inquiry into
evidence extrinsic to the confession of a mentally ill person before
admitting an inherently unreliable confession into evidence.200
B. THE WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
In the second portion of his dissent, Justice Brennan concluded
that the majority had improperly considered two issues involving
Miranda v. Arizona 20 1 which the state had not raised in its petition for
certiorari: the burden of proof that the state must meet in establish-
ing the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, and "the effect of
192 Id. at 529-30. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
541 (1961); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964)).
193 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985);
Barefootv. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 925 (1983)(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Fosterv. Califor-
nia, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)("[T]he American
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial."); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949)).
195 Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting the Connelly majority, id. at 522).
199 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). "There is not a shred of evidence in this record link-
ing the defendant to the charged homicide." Id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 530-31 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
201 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
898 [Vol. 78
1988] SELF-INCRIMINATION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED
mental illness on the waiver of those rights in the absence of police
misconduct." 20 2 Justice Brennan "emphatically" dissented from the
Court's holding that the state must meet only a preponderance stan-
dard to prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights. 203 Justice Brennan
also dissented from the Court's conclusion that any waiver is auto-
matically voluntary as long as it occurs without evidence of police
misconduct. 20 4
Relying initially on the Miranda decision itself, Justice Brennan
claimed that the majority ignored clear precedent mandating a heav-
ier burden of establishing a valid waiver of Miranda rights than a
mere preponderance standard.20 5 He affirmed the Miranda Court's
rationale:
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof for
the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as
applied to in-custody interrogation." 20 6
Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued, the Supreme Court has de-
scribed the state's burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights as
"great" or "heavy." 20 7 The dissent further observed that the Court
required the prosecution to meet a clear and convincing standard in
proving that evidence procured at police lineups is not "tainted"
under the sixth amendment by the absence of a suspect's attor-
ney.208 The Court in Connelly, Justice Brennan concluded, ignored
202 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added by
Justice Brennan))(citations omitted). Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in
Miranda, relied extensively on two Supreme Court decisions: Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964); andJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937)("[C]ourts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights."). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
207 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Tague v. Louisiana, 444
U.S. 469, 470-71 (1980)(quoting Miranda decision's language requiring a "heavy" bur-
den for a knowing and intelligent waiver); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979)("The prosecution's burden is great" in proving a waiver of Miranda rights.);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)("To preserve the fairness of the
trial process the Court established an appropriately heavy burden on the Government
before waiver could be found.")).
208 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240
(1967)("We do not think [that a sixth amendment lineup decision] can be justified with-
out first giving the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the in-court identifications of the suspect were based upon observations of
the suspect other than the lineup identification.")).
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Supreme Court precedent by requiring only a preponderance
standard.209
In response to ChiefJustice Rehnquist's analysis of Lego v. Two-
mey, 210Justice Brennan attempted to demonstrate that a higher stan-
dard of proof should be required in cases involving a Miranda waiver
than in cases involving a determination of a confession's voluntari-
ness. 211 After desribing the two premises of the Lego Court's hold-
ing,2 12 Justice Brennan reaffirmed the rationale of his Lego
dissent.213 His Lego dissent stressed that a court should never admit
involuntary confessions in criminal cases. 2 14 Moreover, Justice
Brennan reasoned, a less burdensome standard, such as the pro-
ponderance standard of proof, would undoubtedly allow the admis-
sion of more involuntary confessions than would a clear and
convincing or reasonable doubt standard.215 Justice Brennan stated
that "'[c]ompelled self-incrimination is so alien to the American
sense of justice that I see no way that such a view could ever be
justified.' "216 The Connelly dissent went on to argue, however, that
even if the plurality in Lego was "correct," the Lego Court's holding
should not be applied to the Connelly case.2 17 The implicit rationale
in the Lego decision, Justice Brennan reasoned, was that all involun-
tary confessions are excluded. 218 The reliability of those confes-
sions that were admitted, therefore, was not an important
concern. 219 Justice Brennan emphasized that by limiting the "vol-
untariness" question to those situations involving police miscon-
duct, confessions resulting from other compulsions, such as mental
209 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210 404 U.S. 477 (1972). For a discussion of the Lego decision, see infra notes 73-79
and accompanying text.
211 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212 See id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, Justice Brennan explained that relia-
bility is not a concern in determining a confession's voluntariness because all involun-
tary confessions are excluded. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Brennan
pointed out that the Lego Court rejected the argument that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt would best serve the values that the exclusionary rule was meant to protect. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
213 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued in his
Lego dissent that requiring a lower standard of proof for proving a waiver of Miranda
rights necessarily results in the conviction of more defendants who are in reality inno-
cent. Lego, 404 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes
287-90.
214 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
216 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lego, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
217 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
900 [Vol. 78
1988] SELF-INCRIMINATION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED 901
illness, would be admitted.220 In the dissent's view, the reliability of
such confessions is questionable. 22' Because the admission of con-
fessions given by mentally incapacitated defendants can affect the
reliability of jury verdicts, Justice Brennan concluded, a higher evi-
dentiary standard is appropriate.222 Finally, the dissent distin-
guished Lego by pointing out that Lego involved a non-custodial
situation and that Connelly involved the waiver of Miranda rights in a
custodial setting.223 Because the potential for police abuses in-
creases in the "coercive custodial interrogation atmosphere," Jus-
tice Brennan argued that the government should be required to
prove a waiver of Miranda rights under a higher standard of
proof.224
Turning to the requirement that a waiver of Miranda rights
must be knowing and intelligent, Justice Brennan attempted to
demonstrate that Connelly's mental condition made a knowing and
intelligent waiver impossible.225 Employing Moran v. Burbine,226 the
dissent argued that the determination of knowing and intelligent
waiver involves two elements. 227 First, the police must not have co-
erced or deceived a defendant into making a waiver. 228 Second, the
defendant must have fully understood the nature of the rights aban-
doned and must have comprehended the consequences of such an
action.229 Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, "[t]he two re-
quirements are independent: '[o]nly if the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court prop-
220 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also explained that the Lego decision
has been criticized for never adequately demonstrating why the preponderance standard
would be more appropriate than the more intermediate clear and convincing standard.
Id. at n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Brennan misread Lego. The
Lego defendant was in custody at the time of his confession. Lego, 404 U.S. at 480 ("The
evidence introduced against Lego at trial included a confession he had made to police
after arrest and while in custody at the station house.")(emphasis added).
224 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued
that even if the lower standard of proof is the appropriate one, the state still failed to
prove its case. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado, Dr. Metzner, the state psychiatrist, established that Connelly was unable to make a
"free decision" concerning his Miranda rights. Id. at 532-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, it was impossible for Connelly to "voluntarily"
waive his rights. Id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225 See id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
227 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141).
229 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141).
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erly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.' "230 Justice
Brennan concluded by pointing out that the Colorado Supreme
Court determined that Connelly "clearly" could not have made an
"intelligent" decision.231
Addressing the task facing the Colorado Supreme Court on re-
mand, the dissent pointed out that the majority did not consider the
knowing and intelligent requirements of the waiver question.232
Justice Brennan also stressed that the majority left the Colorado
Supreme Court "free on remand to reconsider other issues not in-
consistent with the Court's opinion." 233 Therefore, the dissent con-
cluded, the Colorado Supreme Court should be able to
independently consider whether Connelly knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his Miranda rights. 234
IX. ANALYSIS
A. THE DUE PROCESS "VOLUNTARINESS" STANDARD: A NECESSARY
LINK WITH STATE MISCONDUCT
The majority in Colorado v. Connelly accurately described the nec-
essary connection between police misconduct and the determina-
tion of the "involuntariness" of a confession.2 35 Forces outside
police misconduct may provide compulsion which impairs a sus-
pect's volitional abilities. Without some degree of police overreach-
ing, however, confessions resulting from such compulsion are not
involuntary under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
On the contrary, the underlying goals of a criminal trial mandate the
admission of a confession despite the "inducement" imposed by a
mental illness. The reliability of a confession, moreover, is an in-
quiry better suited for the states' rules of evidence rather than the
constitutional voluntariness analysis.
The Connelly dissent unconvincingly argued that the Court
could find a confession involuntary in the absence of police miscon-
230 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quotingMoran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141)(emphasis added by
Justice Brennan).
231 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court reverses the entire judgment, however,
without explaining how a 'mistaken view of voluntariness' could 'taint' this independent
justification for suppressing the custodial confession.")(emphasis added).
233 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also emphasized that the majority
ruling in Connelly did not preclude a contrary decision by the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado based upon the court's interpretation of its own state constitution. Id. (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
235 For the examination of the majority's "voluntariness" analysis, see supra notes 87-
128 and accompanying text.
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duct. Justice Brennan asserted that a confession should be sup-
pressed whenever a defendant confesses as a result of any type of
compulsion, even if the police did not act improperly.2 36 The dis-
sent, unfortunately, misinterpreted fifty years of Supreme Court due
process jurisprudence. This misreading resulted from a reliance on
excerpts from Supreme Court opinions taken out of context from
the original discussions. For instance, Justice Brennan stated:
"The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly estab-
lished test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test
of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . . The line of distinction is
that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever
nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession." 237
The passage from Culombe v. Connecticut23 8 which Justice Brennan
extracted, however, was only a portion of the Court's discussion on
how to analyze the voluntariness of a confession in the context ofpossi-
ble police misconduct.239 The defendant in Columbe confessed only after
the police questioned him for several days. 240 During the interroga-
tion, furthermore, the police extracted small pieces of information
at a time after which the state "composed" Culombe's final state-
ment.241 The Court's entire analysis in Culombe focused upon the
defendant's mental condition and his ability to resist police
coercion.2 42
In his Connelly dissent, Justice Brennan also concluded that "[a]
true commitment to fundamental fairness requires that the inquiry
236 For the examination of the dissent's "voluntariness" analysis, see supra notes 173-
200 and accompanying text.
237 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)(emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
238 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
239 Id. at 601-02. The Culombe Court stated that "[e]ach of these factors in company
with all of the surrounding circumstances--the duration and conditions of detention.... the
manifest attitude of the police towards [the suspect], his physical and mental state, the diverse
pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control-is relevant."
Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
240 Id. at 607-21.
241 Id. at 606-2 1. Culombe, moreover, appeared in court on a fictitious breach-of-the-
peace charge. Id. at 632. In court, Culombe was placed in a wire cage in the corner of
the room. In addition to enduring a courtroom crowded with photographers and hostile
townspeople, Culombe was not represented by an attorney although he had requested
one. The Supreme Court explained that these coercive tactics gave the police more time
to pursue the investigation and enabled them to improperly intimidate Culombe. Id. at
612.
242 Id. at 612. The Culombe Court stated that "what must enter our judgment about
Culombe's mental equipment-that he is suggestible and subject to intimidation-does
not permit us to attribute to him powers of resistance comparable to those [who possess
normal mental capacity]." Id. at 625.
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be 'not whether the conduct of state officers is shocking, but
whether the confession was "free and voluntary". .' ",243 Justice
Brennan, though, omitted much of this sentence quoted from Malloy
v. Hogan. In the same sentence that Justice Brennan quoted, the
Malloy Court went on to qualify the "free and voluntary" standard
by stating:
[T]hat is, [the confession] must not be extracted by any sort of threat
or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any other improper influence.... In
other words the person must not have been compelled to incriminate
himself.
2 4 4
The Connelly dissent, therefore, omitted the significant Malloy qualifi-
cation that the words "free and voluntary" refered to the absence of
state compulsion.
The Culombe and Malloy language relied on by the Connelly dis-
sent in the introduction of its own voluntariness analysis, then, ex-
plicitly stated that voluntariness was necessarily predicated on
police misconduct and not on some independent notion of choice
unconstrained by compulsions of any kind. The Culombe Court ex-
amined the defendant's mental state simply to determine if the sus-
pect could have resisted the actual state misconduct. 245 Ironically,
the defendant's mental condition in Malloy was not even an issue in
that case. 24 6
The Blackburn and Townsend cases, relied upon by both the ma-
jority and dissent in Connelly,247 did not support Justice Brennan's
contention that mental condition alone may determine a confession's
involuntariness. The dissent stated that " '[a]ny questioning by po-
lice officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the
product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible.' "248
Implicit in the Townsend Court's analysis, however, was the critical
causal connection between police conduct and the resulting confes-
243 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 7 (1963)).
244 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7.
245 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 621-35.
246 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963). The police arrested Malloy in a gambling
raid. After he refused to answer questions at a state gambling inquiry because his an-
swers might have incriminated him, the court held Malloy in contempt. The court or-
dered that Malloy be held in jail until he chose to answer the questions. The United
States Supreme Court held that under the fourteenth amendment, Malloy properly in-
voked his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 3. The Court never questioned Mal-
loy's mental condition.
247 See supra notes 106-11 and 177-84 and accompanying text.
248 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at
308 (emphasis added by Justice Brennan)).
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sion. Justice Brennan ignored the fact that in Townsend it was the
police who administered the "truth serum" and pain relievers to the
defendant. 249 Unlike the police in Connelly, therefore, the officers in
Townsend did more than simply question the defendant. Despite the
fact that Townsend may have had his volitional abilities impaired,
the police administration of the drug was a factor which produced
Townsend's confession. 250
Justice Brennan, furthermore, inappropriately relied on the
Townsend Court's deemphasis of police motive in its discussion of
Blackburn v. Alabama.251 Thus, the dissent concluded that "the Town-
send Court interpreted Blackburn as a case involving a confession by a
mentally ill defendant in which the police harbored no improper
purpose." 252 Although the Blackburn Court did conclude that police
motives were irrelevent, the Court did not hold that the confession
was involuntary exclusively on the basis of the defendant's mental
condition at the time of his confession.253 The Blackburn Court con-
sidered all of the relevant factors involved in the defendant's confes-
sion-including the police actions and Blackburn's mental state-in
its decision to render his statements inadmissible. 254 Moreover, a.
court logically should examine the actual conduct of the police
rather than their motives in determining if there was any coercion
involved.255 Without the requisite police action, police motives or
knowledge do little by themselves to induce a confession. If the
state conduct is sufficient to coerce a confession, then the confession
should be involuntary and inadmissible under the due process
clause regardless of the police motives at the time of the coercive
conduct. The Townsend Court, in concluding that the Court in Black-
249 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 298-99.
250 Id. at 307-08.
251 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Townsend, 372 U.S. at
309). The Townsend Court concluded that police knowledge of the drug's properties as a
truth serum was inconsequential. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 308. Justice Brennan stated:
"[I]n Blackburn v. Alabama .... we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper
purpose on the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that
the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we
judged the confession inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant
was in fact insane at the time."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added by jus-
tice Brennan)(citation omitted)).
252 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
254 See id.
255 In Townsend, the critical element was that the police acted as a conscious force in
administering the drug regardless of their motive or knowledge of the drug's effects.
The actual administration of the drug, not the intangible motive behind the decision to
administer the narcotic, induced the confession.
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burn held the defendant's confession involuntary solely because of
his mental condition, ignored the Blackburn Court's analysis of all
the situational elements involved with the confession. Justice Bren-
nan's reliance on the Townsend Court's conclusion, therefore, was
unwarranted. Overall, then, the authorities thatJustice Brennan re-
lied upon did not justify a conclusion that due process involuntari-
ness may be established in the absence of police misconduct. Chief
Justice Rehnquist accurately determined, therefore, that "while
mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility
to police coercion, mere examination of the defendant's state of
mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." 256
Chief Justice Rehnquist also correctly concluded that although
uncoerced confessions of a mentally ill individual may raise ques-
tions about the inherent unreliability of such statements, this relia-
bility determination is not part of the due process inquiry.257 Juries
may not rely on coerced confessions, whether they are true or false,
because " 'the method used to extract them offends constitutional
principles.' "258 Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion for the
Court in Rogers v. Richmond, stated:
[The] decisions under [the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment] have made clear that convictions following the admission
into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of
coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not
because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying [constitutional] principle in the enforcement of
our criminal law . . . To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be
and have been, to an unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy.
But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not
voluntary does not rest on this consideration. 259
256 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that "the cases consid-
ered by this Court for over 50 years since Brown v. Mississippi have focused upon the
crucial element of police overrreaching." Id. at 520 (footnote omitted) (emphasis ad-
ded). The Court's analysis, however, has not necessarily focused on the presence or
absence of police misconduct in the post-Brown cases. In both Blackburn and Townsend,
for example, the Court, in the context of police coercion, focused on each defendant's
state of mind in addressing possible violations of the due process clause. See Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Therefore,
although the majority accurately concluded that police misconduct is at least an indis-
pensible prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness, the Court historically has focused
on a defendant's mental condition in determining the impact of such state misconduct.
257 See Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522. "A statement rendered by one in the condition of
[Connelly] might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by
the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed. Rule. Evid. 601, and not by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
258 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (197 1)(quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 540-41 (1961)) (emphasis added).
259 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41 (emphasis added).
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The voluntariness analysis, therefore, "[is] not aimed at reducing
the possibility of convicting innocent men. ' 260 To the contrary, the
voluntariness calculus is designed to protect the right of a suspect
against self-incrimination.2 6' Justice Brennan's insistence on using
the involuntariness determination as a forum for analyzing reliabil-
ity, then, is without historical precedent.
As the majority in Connelly noted, a trial court should allow the
fact-finder, restricted only by the states' rules of evidence, to under-
take a determination of a confession's reliability.2 62 Because the
guilt or innocence of a defendant may hinge on the confession's ef-
fect on the jury, the concern for the reliability of such a powerfully
persuasive piece of evidence is undoubtedly important.263 The Lego
Court explained, however, that "nothing in Jackson [v. Denno] ques-
tioned the province of juries to assess the truthfulness of confes-
sions.'2 64  Juries, then, should consider the reliability of a
confession in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence. Justice
White clearly stated in Lego:
A defendant has been as free sinceJackson as he was before to familiar-
ize a jury with circumstances that attend the taking of his confession,
including facts bearing upon its weight and voluntariness. In like mea-
sure, of course, juries have been at liberty to disregard confessions
that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of
belief. 265
It is the responsibility of defense counsel, therefore, to attack the
reliability of the confession in court as he or she would attack the
reliability of any other evidence.2 66 The voluntariness determina-
tion simply attempts to protect against confessions obtained in vio-
lation of the due process clause.2 67
If the trial judge were to engage in a reliability analysis, he or
she would have to "divine" the reasons why the defendant chose to
260 Lego, 404 U.S. at 485.
261 Id. (construing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)). In Jackson, the Supreme
Court held that a New York procedure improperly allowed the jury to analyze the truth-
fulness of a confession during its consideration of the confession's voluntariness.
262 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
263 See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 364 (3d ed. 1984).
264 Lego, 404 U.S. at 485. See supra note 76 for a discussion ofJackson v. Denno.
265 Lego, 404 U.S. at 485-86.
266 The dissent in Connelly pointed out the unreliable nature of the defendant's state-
ments in its statement that Connelly was "actively hallucinating and exhibited delusional
thinking at the time of his confession." Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). These are excellent examples of the reliability concerns the jury should consider in
weighing the evidence.
267 Lego, 404 U.S. at 485. "The use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is
forbidden because the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles."
Id. (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961)).
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make incriminating statements. 268 The analysis of a defendant's
mental condition is, by its nature, an imprecise science. Without
police coercion, a court would have to engage in the hairsplitting
task of finding the exact reason why a defendant confessed. A
number of different reasons could explain how or why an individual
confessed in the absence of police misconduct. Justice Brennan, on
the other hand, explained that the majority's concern with this di-
vining process was unwarranted because courts typically engage in a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. 269 But the dissent oversim-
plified the "totality" analysis involved in a case such as Connelly's in
which the determinative issue is the defendant's mentally impaired
state. 270 In previous cases in which the mental state of the defend-
ant was at issue, the Court has examined a wide variety of elements
in a voluntariness determination, including the length of interroga-
tion, the tactics used by the police, the race of the defendant, the
absence of the suspect's counsel and friends, and the composing of
the statement by the officers as opposed to the defendant. 271 Unlike
a determination of the defendant's state of mind, a court can more
easily quantify and evaluate these situational elements. If a court
only has a defendant's state of mind to analyze, the task of determin-
ing the actual impetus to confess is excessively subjective. The
question of why an individual confesses outside of police coercion,
therefore, is an inquiry for the jury when it considers the truthful-
ness or reliability of a confession.
Admitting a mentally ill individual's confession as "voluntary"
without evidence of police misconduct, then, does not violate that
defendant's rights under the fourteenth amendment. A confession
cannot be involuntary under the due process rubric in the absence
of police coercion. The reliability of a confession, therefore, should
be examined by the trier of fact when considering the substantive
issues relating to the defendant's guilt or innocence. As a further
precaution, however, a trial judge should specifically warn the jury
to guard against equating voluntariness with reliability or truthful-
ness. In the absence of police coercion in Connelly, the Supreme
Court correctly allowed Connelly's statements into evidence.
268 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
269 Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority admitted
that a defendant's state of mind has recently played a more significant role in an "invol-
untariness" determination. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Connelly questioned whether the police con-
duct was coercive. See id. at 522.
271 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1960); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1959).
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B. WAIVING THE MIRANDA RIGHTS: REQUIRING A MORE STRINGENT
BURDEN OF PROOF
The majority in Colorado v. Connelly erred in concluding that the
state need only meet a lower preponderance standard in proving a
valid waiver of Miranda rights. 272 In order for a suspect to waive his
Miranda rights, the state must prove that the suspect voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 273 Unfortunately for the Connelly
Court, neither Miranda v. Arizona nor its progeny established what
would constitute a "heavy" burden of proof in order for the state to
successfully establish a waiver of Miranda rights.274 Historically, the
Court has implicitly required a higher standard, such as a "dear and
convincing" or a "reasonable doubt" standard, for proving a know-
ing and intelligent waiver. 27 5 Moreover, although Chief Justice
Rehnquist discussed the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights,
he neglected to explicitly examine whether Connelly knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued for a less strenuous preponder-
ance standard for the inquiry into the voluntariness of a Miranda
waiver. The ChiefJustice equated the policies discussed in Lego dis-
couraging the use of involuntary confessions with the policies dis-
couraging the procurement of involuntary waivers of Miranda
rights. 276 Like the "voluntariness" required for the admissibility of
a confession, the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights is unre-
lated to the specific elements of a given crime. Courts exclude evi-
dence because of constitutional violations of defendants' rights. 277
272 ChiefJustice Rehnquist analyzed the voluntariness of the confession in his discus-
sion of the appropriate standard of proof for a waiver of Miranda rights. Connelly, 107 S.
Ct. at 522-23. However, he never explicitly limited the application of the confession
"voluntariness" analysis to the voluntariness component of a Miranda waiver. He con-
cluded that "the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence" and
"a waiver of the auxiliary protection established in Miranda should require no higher
burden of proof [than the preponderance standard]." Id. at 523. The only logical inter-
pretation of the majority's language is that ChiefJustice Rehnquist required the prepon-
derance standard for the whole of the Miranda waiver as opposed to only the
voluntariness component.
273 See supra text accompanying note 81.
274 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text. In his discussion of Lego, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated what he believed to be the holding in that case: "[w]henever
the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defend-
ant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver
only by a preponderance of the evidence." Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523. In reality, Lego
claimed no violation of Miranda. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
277 Lego, 404 U.S. at 489.
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Evidence is not excluded, however, because of its unreliability. 278
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the same standard of proof
should apply to the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights that
governs the voluntariness of a confession because the resulting ex-
clusion of evidence rests upon the same fundamental principle: vio-
lation of a defendant's constitutional rights. 279 In the context of
voluntariness of a waiver, then, the majority concluded:
Exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct
by police and prosecution and it is very doubtful that escalating the
prosecution's burden of proof in suppression hearings would be suffi-
ciently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in
placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence. 280
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, improperly applied Lego in
his determination of the proper burden of proof required for a
waiver of Miranda rights. 28 1 The question in Lego involved the bur-
den of proof in establishing the voluntariness of a confession.282 His-
torically, in cases such as Lego, the Court has analyzed a confession's
voluntariness through the generalized notions of fairness embodied
in the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 283 Chief Justice
Rehnquist himself stated in Connelly that "[t]he Court has retained
this [fourteenth amendment] due process focus even after holding
in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination applies to the States." 284 In contrast, the
Miranda Court employed the specific fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in judging the admissibility of an individ-
ual's statements. 285 The Miranda decision, therefore, "reflects
greater sensitivity to the risk to Fifth Amendment interests posed by
certain subtle influences that might be brought to bear upon a sus-
pect's decisionmaking process; this suggests that the standard might
be construed as tighter than under pre-Miranda law." 28 6 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, therefore, improperly blurred the distinctions be-
tween the two lines of constitutional jurisprudence by equating the
278 Id. at 488.
279 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522-23.
280 Id. at 523 (quoting Lego, 404 U.S. at 489).
281 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the voluntariness calculus for a Miranda
waiver, like the determination of voluntariness for a confession, is necessarily predicated
on police misconduct. Id. at 524. That proposition is not questioned here.
282 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
283 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1935); Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445
(1985).
284 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520 (citation omitted).
285 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
286 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 398 (3d ed. 1984).
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burden of proof required to prove the voluntariness of a confession
with the burden required to prove the voluntariness of a waiver of
Miranda rights.
Justice Brennan's Connelly dissent, though, advocating a higher
burden of proof because of a confession's potential unreliability,
failed to refute Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument analogizing the
voluntariness of a confession with the voluntariness of a waiver of
Miranda rights. Relying on his dissent in Lego, Justice Brennan
demonstrated how a lower standard of proof necessarily results in
the conviction of more innocent people.28 7 The less strenuous pre-
ponderance standard, he argued, allows a court to admit more in-
voluntary confessions. 288 The admission of a higher number of
involuntary confessions, he asserted, increases the likelihood of the
admission of unreliable confessions. 289 Justice Brennan concluded
that the admittance of more unreliable confessions necessarily re-
sults in more convictions of innocent people.290 In his Connelly dis-
sent, Justice Brennan also emphasized the strong persuasive effect
of a confession on the jury.29' Justice Brennan, however, failed to
note that courts employ exclusionary rules for concerns other than
the reliability of the evidence. As ChiefJustice Rehnquist detailed,
courts exclude evidence to protect against violations of the Consti-
tution and not to protect against inherently unreliable evidence. 292
The trial process, through its evidentiary protections, is designed to
protect the defendant in confession situations. A possibly unrelia-
ble confession, like any other evidence, should be considered by the
jury and properly weighed. Therefore, although Justice Brennan
validly argued that more unreliable confessions will mean that more
innocent people may be convicted, the standard of proof in the vol-
untariness calculus was not designed to cure this problem.
The majority, moreover, left the analysis of Connelly's at-
tempted waiver incomplete. The Miranda Court held that a waiver
of fifth amendment rights must be knowing and intelligent as well as
voluntary.293 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, failed to explicitly
evaluate whether Connelly's waiver was both knowing and intelli-
gent. Instead, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that a lower stan-
287 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 493
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
288 Lego, 404 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)).
292 See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
293 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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dard of proof is appropriate based on the Lego voluntariness
analysis. The state's burden, though, should approach at least the
higher clear and convincing standard. In the Miranda decision itself,
Chief Justice Warren stated that "a heavy burden rests on the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to re-
tained or appointed cousel." 294 The Miranda Court, therefore, re-
quired "high" standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional
rights in the context of custodial interrogations. 295 Similarly, post-
Miranda Courts have required a "higher" or "heavy" burden for the
state in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights.
The Court in Tague v. Louisiana,296 for instance, quoted Miranda in
discussing the heavy burden on the state in proving a knowing and
intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Likewise, the Court in North
Carolina v. Butler 297 found that "the prosecution's burden is great"
in establishing a waiver of Miranda rights. 298 The Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte299 also found that the state has a "heavy"
burden in proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of fourth
amendment rights.
The Court in Miranda, Schneckloth, and Tague also relied on the
rationale in Johnson v. Zerbst. 300 In Johnson, the Court concluded that
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights."301 In establishing the appropri-
ate burden of proof, the Johnson Court also considered the gravity of
criminal cases in which the accused's life or liberty are at stake, espe-
cially in the absence of counsel.30 2 Common sense and the Court's
language and rationale, therefore, dictate that a "heavy" standard of
proof for a knowing and intelligent waiver requires a standard more
burdensome than the preponderance standard that Chief Justice
Rehnquist advocated.
The Colorado Supreme Court, then, did not err in upholding
the suppression of Connelly's statements. The Colorado court held
that the state did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that
294 Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
295 Id.
296 444 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1980).
297 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1978).
298 Id.
299 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1972).
300 304 U.S. 458 (1937). The defendants in Johnson were tried and convicted without
the assistance of counsel. Id. at 460. The state claimed that the defendants waived their
sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 464. For a discussion of the Johnson decision,
see supra note 83.
301 304 U.S. at 464.
302 Id. at 465.
912 [Vol. 78
1988] SELF-INCRIMINATION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED
Connelly knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The
Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine303 recently concluded that a
knowing and intelligent waiver "must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.' '3O4 Unlike the defend-
ant in Moran, however, Connelly suffered from a mental illness
which impaired his volitional control.30 5 Although Connelly may
have understood his rights at the time they were read to him, his
volitional impairment likely vitiated a clear understanding of the
consequences of a waiver of Miranda rights. The Colorado Supreme
Court, moreover, concluded that a waiver of Connelly's Miranda
rights had been impossible because he clearly had been unable to
make an "intelligent" decision without this volitional control.3 06
The Court, therefore, should have affirmed the Colorado Supreme
Court's ruling upholding the suppression of Connelly's custodial
statements.
Overall, the fourteenth amendment's protection against the
state's use of an "involuntary" confession did not mandate suppres-
sion of either Connelly's precustodial or custodial statements.
However, because Miranda and its progeny have required more than
the preponderance standard asserted by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Connelly's custodial statements should have been suppressed. The
only statements that should have been allowed into evidence, then,
were those made by Connelly to Officer Anderson before Anderson
advised Connelly of his rights and took him into custody.
X. CONCLUSION
Balancing the interests of the trial process in determining the
guilt or innocence of an accused and the interests of the individual
in preventing compelled self-incrimination is, admittedly, a difficult
area of constitutional adjudication. The foundations for the specific
rules enunciated in Brown v. Mississippi and Miranda v. Arizona were
303 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
304 Id. at 1141. For a discussion of the Moran decision, see supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
305 The waiver issue in Moran did not relate to the defendant's state of mind. Moran,
106 S. Ct. at 1141. On the other hand, Connelly understood his rights but suffered from
a mental condition that impaired his ability to make free and rational choices. Connelly,
107 S. Ct. at 519.
306 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985). As Justice Brennan pointed
out, Dr. Metzner testified that 'when [Connelly] was read his Miranda rights, he proba-
bly had the capacity to know that he was being read his Miranda rights [but] he wasn't
able to use that information because of the command hallucinations that he had exper-
ienced.'" Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 526 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quoting Record at 56-57).
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established long before those cases were decided. 30 7 These exclu-
sionary rules, however, are not without limits. Under the due pro-
cess clause, for example, a trial court need not suppress a confession
if a suspect confesses in the absence of any coercive actions commit-
ted by state agents. Thus, a suspect's mental condition by itself may
not invalidate a confession. The Connelly majority, therefore, justifi-
ably limited the definition of "involuntary" statements to those
statements resulting from police misconduct. The Court, however,
incorrectly concluded that mental condition alone may not invali-
date a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights. Unlike the require-
ments for a confession under the fourteenth amendment, a waiver
of Miranda rights must also be knowing and intelligent. The volun-
tariness analysis, therefore, protects suspects from fundamentally
unfair police misconduct. In contrast, Miranda provides greater pro-
tection for the individual: regardless of state action, a suspect may
not waive his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimina-
tion unless he does so with knowledge of the consequences of his
actions.
MICHAEL R. PACE
:07 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-67 (discussing the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination beginning with thirteenth century commentators exploring the privi-
lege in the Bible); Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581-87 (discussing the antecedents of the four-
teenth amendment voluntariness determination beginning with eighteenth century
English case law).
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